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The Costs of Responsibility for the Political Establishment of the Eurozone (1999-2015)§ 
 
Sonia Alonso (Georgetown University Qatar) 
Rubén Ruiz-Rufino (King’s College London) 
 
Abstract 
The objective of this article is to analyse the costs of responsible governance on the national 
political establishment of the Eurozone in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Our 
analysis tests two main hypotheses. First, we argue that financial crises like the one unleashed 
by the global financial meltdown of 2008 have an asymmetric impact on the electoral takes of 
establishment parties depending on whether the countries affected by the financial crisis were 
financially intervened or not. Our second hypothesis states that externally imposed austerity 
affects Left and Right national establishment parties differently. By choosing to act responsibly, 
i.e. assuming the conditions of the intervention, the establishment Left pays a much larger 
electoral price than the one paid by the establishment Right under the same circumstances. To 
test our argument, we use a panel dataset of 12 countries from the Eurozone in the period 
between 1999 (Stage I of the monetary union) and 2015 that contains 54 country-election-year 
observations. Our findings show strong support for our two hypotheses. 
                                                 
§ We would like to specially thank Stephanie Dreher, Elisa Cavatorta and Damien Bol for their comments on 
earlier versions of this paper. We are also grateful for the two anonymous reviewers who revised this article and 
the participants on the workshop on Responsibility and Responsiveness organised by Johannes Karremans and 
Zoe Lefkofridi that took place at the European University Institute in May 2017. 
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Introduction 
The objective of this article is to analyse the costs of responsible governance on the national 
political establishment of the Eurozone in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. This 
crisis unfolded in unique historical circumstances: a monetary union without a full political 
union. Responsibility over crisis management did not rest exclusively or mainly in the hands 
of national governments but it was shared by counter-majoritarian European institutions, like 
the European Central Bank, and by inter-governmental ones, such as the Euro group. In this 
article, we show how the policy impositions coming from these supra-national institutions on 
national governments affected the electoral support of establishment parties. 
 
The sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2012 that resulted from the 2008 global financial meltdown 
triggered two types of direct economic interventions by EU institutions on troubled Eurozone 
economies. Firstly, formal interventions were embodied by the signature of a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (the so-called Troika), on the one hand, and the deficit Eurozone 
member state, on the other. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain1, under increasing pressures 
from the financial markets, signed a MoU2 with the Troika that would bail-out their bankrupted 
states3. Informal interventions, secondly, took the form of undue pressure from the European 
Central Bank (ECB) on deficit Eurozone countries whose sovereign debt was being targeted 
by the financial markets in the spring of 2011 but which were too big to be bailed-out4. What 
were the political consequences of these external interventions on national political systems? 
 
In previous research, scholars have mostly analysed this relationship focusing on the case of 
Southern Europe, with some remarkable exceptions (Giuliani and Massari 2017). The existing 
explanations have centred, on the one hand, on the size and extent of electoral punishment for 
the incumbent parties, i.e. the "electoral epidemic" (Bosco and Verney 2012; Bellucci 2014; 
Freire et al. 2014) and, on the other, on the difficulties for the formation and stability of 
governments, i.e. the "government" epidemic (Bosco and Verney 2016). Our objective is thus 
                                                 
1 This paper looks only at the 12 countries that adopted the Euro from Stage I of the European Monetary Union. 
These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Cyprus also signed a MoU with the Troika, but it does not belong to our group 
of countries. 
2 Greece eventually signed three MoUs in the period 2010-2015. 
3 The bail-out in Spain only targeted the banking system. 
4 Here we are mainly referring to Spain and Italy but such informal pressures also took place on Ireland. See 
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/trichet-letters 
3 
 
not to explain this "bonfire of incumbents" taking place during the years of Europe's great 
recession in Southern Europe (Laffan 2014). Elsewhere, we have already shown the negative 
consequences of the primacy of responsibility for the levels of satisfaction with democracy in 
the Eurozone periphery (Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso 2017). Our objective here is to analyse the 
electoral consequences for the political establishment as a whole of prioritizing responsibility 
over responsiveness during the crisis.  
 
We use the definitions of responsiveness and responsibility adopted by the West European 
Politics special issue on responsible and responsive parties (2014): "Responsiveness is 
generally identified with the tendency, and indeed the normative claim, that political parties 
and leaders (...) sympathetically respond to the short-term demands of voters, public opinion, 
interest groups, and the media (...). Responsibility is identified here with the necessity for those 
same parties and leaders to take into account (a) the long-term needs of their people and 
countries, which have not necessarily been articulated as specific demands and which underlie 
and go beyond the short-term demands of those same people (...); (b) the claims of audiences 
other than the national electoral audience, including the international markets that ensure their 
financial alimentation, the international commitments and organisations that are the root of 
their international credibility, and, in the European context in particular, the heavy transnational 
conditions of constraint that are the result of a common currency and common market" (Bardi 
et al. 2014: 237). 
 
We define establishment parties as those historical centre-left and centre-right national-level 
parties that led the process of construction of the EU and the monetary union. We chose the 
term "establishment" consciously. The term "establishment" puts the emphasis on those actors 
with power to make the most important political decisions, irrespective of what those decisions 
may look like. The term "mainstream", on the other hand, focuses on issue positions and 
policies that in turn define party families across particular cleavages and ideologies. As such, 
the meaning of "mainstream" is extremely sensitive to context, changing across time and across 
societies, whereas the meaning of "establishment" is not; it refers to those actors that belong to 
the inner circle of power and, therefore, its meaning is not context-dependent. The 
establishment parties under analysis in this paper are those that had the power, at critical 
junctures of post-WWII Europe, to shape the construction of the European Union until today. 
Among them we find parties from different families and, as such, upholding mainstream 
4 
 
policies and values to different degrees (from social democratic and even communist parties to 
conservative and liberal ones). 
 
Our analysis tests two main hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that financial crises like the one 
unleashed by the global financial meltdown of 2008 have an asymmetric impact on the electoral 
takes of establishment parties depending on whether the countries affected by the financial 
crisis have room to manoeuvre a response to the crisis or not: establishment parties in countries 
whose governments have their hands de facto tied regarding monetary and fiscal policy are 
expected to suffer more losses than elsewhere. The reason is that the de facto lack of room to 
manoeuvre forces these countries to choose responsibility over responsiveness, irrespective of 
the type of party in office. All establishment parties in office are equally tied by the need to 
prioritize responsibility. Although in the short-term national governments might be exonerated 
as voters are increasingly aware of their constrained autonomy, in the medium and long-term 
repeated lack of responsiveness on the part of incumbent establishment parties has negative 
effects on citizens’ beliefs about the capacity of the political establishment to solve the crisis. 
 
Applied to the Eurozone, this hypothesis needs further qualification. Eurozone economies are, 
in theory, equally bounded by the rules that govern the monetary union. The adoption of the 
Euro implied a de jure absence of national monetary policy autonomy in the years before the 
sovereign debt crisis, which was shared by all countries of the Eurozone. De facto, however, 
we argue here that there was enough room for manoeuvre so that Eurozone countries could still 
balance the requirements of responsibility with the needs to be responsive. When the financial 
crisis hit Europe, by contrast, the de jure room for manoeuvre disappeared in some countries, 
those whose economies revealed highly vulnerable to the behaviour of the financial markets 
and which eventually had to be intervened by EU institutions. When this happened, the citizens 
of intervened countries observed a de facto loss of fiscal sovereignty. Establishment parties, in 
office and in opposition, committed themselves to implement severe fiscal adjustment policies 
even if their citizens were against them5. At this moment, responsibility trumped 
responsiveness and establishment parties saw their electoral support fall, and even collapse.  
 
                                                 
5 An increasing number of voices, among them the IMF itself, are saying that, in the case of Greece, abandoning 
fiscal adjustment and restructuring public debt is not just a question of popular preferences but of rational 
economic behaviour. 
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Our second hypothesis looks deeper into the implications of the first. We hypothesize that 
externally imposed austerity affects Left and Right establishment parties differently. 
Traditionally, social-democratic parties have pursued an agenda based on increasing social 
protection and reducing inequalities by implementing policies that simultaneously sought to 
reconcile fiscal discipline with public spending in the form of redistribution (Esping-Andersen 
2017). This type of policies mostly benefited low and middle classes which also constituted 
much of the electoral support of social-democratic parties. After the adoption of the Euro, these 
parties still had room to deliver their traditional policies despite the constraints of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP), for reasons that will be discussed later. However, once the financial 
crisis transmuted into a sovereign debt crisis, incumbent social-democratic parties in deficit 
Eurozone countries lost the capacity to deliver their traditional policies. The dilemma that all 
social-democratic parties typically face inside the Eurozone, how to balance the requirements 
of fiscal responsibility and the preferences of traditional Left electorates (Cameron 2012), 
transmuted into a lack of alternative policy paths. Pressed by the need to bail-out their 
economies, social-democratic parties in office chose to tie their hands under the conditions set 
by the Troika. By choosing to act responsibly, the establishment Left would pay a formidable 
price (Bohrer and Tan 2000), much larger, we argue, than the price paid by the establishment 
Right under the same circumstances. 
 
To test our argument, we use a panel dataset of 12 countries from the Eurozone in the period 
between 1999 (Stage I of the monetary union) and 2015. Our dataset contains 54 country-
election-year observations. Our findings confirm our two hypotheses. First, support to 
establishment parties fell more rapidly in countries that were financially intervened than in 
non-intervened ones. Secondly, support to Left establishment parties decreased sharply when 
bailouts had to be agreed and managed by Left parties; however, Right parties were unaffected 
by such events. 
 
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The second section presents our main argument 
and is divided into four sub-sections: the first one discusses the tension between responsibility 
and responsiveness; the second one introduces the differentiation between de jure and de facto 
policy constraints; the third sub-section develops the relationship between ideology and 
financial intervention and the last sub-section offers some descriptive data illustrating these 
ideas. This is followed by a third, fourth, fifth and sixth sections where the data, the discussion 
of the main variables, the empirical tests and the discussion of the main findings are presented. 
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Section seven discusses some relevant robustness tests. Finally, the eight, and last, section 
presents some concluding remarks and introduces paths for future research. 
 
1. The costs of responsibility for the Eurozone political establishment 
 
1.1. The tension between responsibility and responsiveness within representative 
government 
For some, representative government, while not exactly "government by the people", was, at 
the time of its inception in the aftermath of the French revolution, the most feasible 
approximation for largely populated polities; for others, it was also an improvement over direct 
democracy from a normative as well as a pragmatic point of view. Representative democracy 
combined the advantages of an expert elite dedicated to the business of government with the 
consent from the masses whose interests and preferences were represented by the elected 
politicians. Representatives were thus acting "on behalf" of the people (Manin 1997). There is, 
here, however an inherent tension between the delegate and trustee models of representation 
(Ferrin and Kriesi 2016; Caramani 2017). The delegate model understands representation as a 
mandate from the people to her representatives and the emphasis is, therefore, largely on 
responsiveness: the preferences of representatives and represented are congruent and citizens 
vote prospectively for those representatives that are most similar to their own preferences 
(Caramani 2017). In the trustee model, on the other hand, the representative acts in defence of 
the interests of her trustees, the citizens, and she is trusted in her expertise to do what is best 
for the represented. The emphasis is, therefore, on accountability and voting is retrospective, 
based on competence and performance (Caramani 2017).  
 
According to the responsible party model, political parties embodied, in times past, the 
overcoming of this tension by simultaneously combining the function of representation 
(ideological congruence and responsiveness) with that of governing (responsibility and 
competence) (Bardi et al. 2014). Since at least the 1980s, however, the tension has resurfaced 
(assuming it had ever gone away). One of the main causes of this resurgence is that much of 
public policy is no longer decided by the party in government but by an array of national, 
supranational and international "non-majoritarian" institutions, which Mair characterized as 
"non-partisan bodies that operate at arm’s length from party leaders" (Mair 2008:227). The 
result is that "[p]arty, in this sense, loses much of its representative and purposive identity and, 
by the same token, citizens forfeit much of their capacity to control policy-makers through 
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conventional electoral channels" (Mair 2008: 228). The EU is a special case of supranational 
institution that combines majoritarian and non-majoritarian forms of representation which 
exacerbate the tension between the representative and the governing functions of political 
parties. 
 
Elected national governments have a dual role to play in the European Union: as founding 
member states severally and as member states jointly (Van Middelaar 2013). As member states 
severally, national governments represent –and are accountable to– their respective national 
publics and their main objective is to be responsive to them, defending national interests at the 
European table (the European Council); as member states jointly, they have the responsibility 
to bring to the European table the acquiescence of their respective national populations or 
parliaments to the decisions adopted jointly. In other words, EU national governments wear 
two hats, one on behalf of their respective states and one on behalf of Europe (Van Middelaar 
2013, Laffan 2014). The conflict emerges because national governments, being accountable to 
their national constituencies and only to them, are trapped between the pressure to be 
responsive at home and the need to be responsible to their EU partners and the EU agreements. 
In normal political circumstances, this trade-off is navigated more or less successfully by 
national politicians through a combination of blame avoidance (Van Middelaar 2013, Hellwig 
2015), negotiating skills at the European joint table (Rae Baerg and Hallerberg 2016) and sheer 
shirking or free riding on EU agreements and decisions (Copelovitch et al. 2016). There are, 
however, special political circumstances, like those triggered by the global financial crisis, 
when national governments have to choose -or are forced to choose- between responsiveness 
and responsibility. We study here the political consequences of prioritizing responsibility over 
responsiveness. 
 
1.2. De jure and de facto policy constraints inside the Eurozone  
An important element in the development of our argument relates to the difference between the 
de jure policy constraints and the de facto room for manoeuvre of national governments within 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) before and after the outbreak of the 2010 sovereign debt 
crisis. We argue that this key distinction between de jure and de facto room for manoeuvre is 
precisely what accounts for the variations in the levels of citizens’ support to establishment 
parties, i.e. the parties that took turns in office to make the decisions that shaped the EU's 
institutional architecture.  
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It is broadly accepted that, since its creation in 1956, what is known today as the EU has been 
an elite-driven endeavour. In this sense, the European project has been the result of a post-
WWII elite consensus among the centre-left and centre-right establishment parties with little 
participation from below (Mair 2013; Usherwood and Startin 2013). In the literature, this is 
referred to as the "permissive consensus" precisely because the European publics were tolerant 
of European integration, particularly during the early years. Starting in the 1980s, however, 
many European publics began to show their disagreement with particular aspects of the project 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009). With the exception, perhaps, of the Southern European strip, where 
for reasons related to good governance and democratic consolidation a majority of the citizenry 
were convinced Europhiles (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000), Euroscepticism has increased with every 
step towards deeper and wider integration6. The launching of EMU and its fiscal counterpart, 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), proceeded ahead regardless of the voices that were 
unconvinced by the project, propelled by the deliberate consensus at the top, on both the Right 
and the Left, and the permissive consensus from below. Under EMU and SGP, the member 
states of the EU had their fiscal and monetary policy autonomy severely constrained. 
Membership in the EU came with strings attached to it: eventually a trade-off could emerge 
between macroeconomic stability (i.e. responsibility) and political legitimacy (i.e. 
responsiveness). As French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin explicitly acknowledged upon taking 
office in 1997, “the French might have to choose between meeting [the Maastricht criteria] and 
creating employment” (as quoted by Moss 1998: 247). 
 
As established in the SGP, the coordination of national fiscal policy is the responsibility of the 
European Commission and the European Council. The European Commission acts as the 
'watchdog' in charge of keeping national governments' fiscal policies in line. In practice, 
however, such role has been undermined by the behaviour of the Council of Economic and 
Finance Ministers (EcoFin). According to the exhaustive analysis realized by Baerg and 
Hallerberg, member states of the EcoFin have been very successful at weakening the very rules 
they had agreed to in the SGP (Baerg and Hallerberg 2016). Weak enforcement of the SGP has 
meant, in turn, that the constraints on national governments' autonomy is a political decision 
rather than a technocratic one (Laffan 2014); it belongs to what Van Middelaar calls the 
                                                 
6 For example, a total of twenty-one EU-related referenda have taken place since 2000 and six of them resulted in 
a "no" vote (28%). If we only look at countries of long membership, where voters have more experience of what 
EU belonging entails, the "no" vote has been registered in four out of eleven referenda, or 27.5% of occasions 
(Usherwood and Startin 2013: 9). 
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“intermediate sphere of member states” and their mutual power relationships (Van Middelaar 
2013: 18). This means that enforcement depended not only on a country's macroeconomic 
situation (the technocratic decision) but also, and most importantly, on political considerations 
that fell outside the SGP (the political decision). In sum, weak enforcement and soft sanctions 
“rendered economic policy-making ‘national’ and therefore susceptible to the usual political 
calculations” (Panagiotarea 2013: 163). National governments had de facto room for 
manoeuvre to remain responsive to their national constituencies. 
 
In fact, until the global financial crisis hit Europe in 2008, the external constraints imposed by 
EU membership on national economic policy were never really perceived by citizens at the 
national level (Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso 2017). There were several instances prior to the Euro 
crisis when national governments suffered the Euro's ‘golden straightjacket’ (Friedman 2000) 
when trying to respond to economic crises7 but, despite the obvious objective constraints on 
national policy autonomy, citizens did not observe a direct external intervention by unelected 
institutions on their national economies. This implied that national governments still called the 
shots in fiscal policy. All that European citizens saw prior to the sovereign debt crisis were the 
usual strings attached to any country operating in an open global economy (Alcañiz and 
Hellwig 2011). 
 
Even in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, therefore, nothing was out of the ordinary: hit 
by the global financial crisis, Eurozone countries decided to breach the SGP to, first, 
accommodate domestic constituencies by applying anti-cyclical policies in the form of 
expansionary fiscal packages, and, second, rescue their national banks full with toxic debt 
products. Responsiveness still trumped responsibility (Bermeo and Pontusson 2012). 
 
In October 2009, however, the Greek balance-of-payment crisis came into the open and 
everything changed. The story is well known and there is no need to repeat it here8. Between 
the spring of 2010 and the summer of 2012 the most vulnerable economies of the Eurozone 
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain), under pressure from the financial markets over their 
                                                 
7 One such case occurred in September 16, 1992, during the so-called Black Wednesday, when the UK had to 
abandon the European exchange rate mechanism. It occurred in Germany during the first half of the 2000s when 
it was deemed the ‘sick man of Europe’, traversing an economic recession that led the country to breach the 
Maastricht Treaty. It also happened to the Mitterrand government of 1983 when it was forced to a pro-austerity 
policy switch (Moss 1998; Armingeon et al. 2016). 
8 See Copelovitch et al. 2016 for an excellent chronology and analysis. 
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sovereign debt, and with no monetary sovereignty to rely on, had to be bailed out (against the 
EMU rules and outside the Treaties) to save the currency union, and the price for their bail-out 
was to transfer a large part of their fiscal sovereignty over to the Troika. Deficit countries, one 
after another, signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) that established a detailed program 
of fiscal adjustment in exchange for the money that would save their states from default. 
 
Informal interventions over the two deficit countries with the largest economies, Italy and 
Spain, were no less binding for their respective national governments than the MoUs. In spring 
of 2011, Spanish and Italian bond yields started to reach unsustainable levels. However, in 
contrast to Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the Spanish and Italian economies were 'too big to be 
bailed-out'. The ECB acted proactively and sent a secret letter to the Spanish and Italian 
governments9 asking them to make a credible commitment to a radical program of fiscal 
adjustment. If they agreed, the ECB would in turn alleviate the pressure on Spain and Italy by 
a massive purchase of Spanish and Italian bonds in the secondary market. On August 23, 2011, 
a constitutional reform was approved by the Socialist incumbent party in Spain, with the 
support of the main opposition conservative party, PP, which fixed a budget deficit limit of 
0.4% of GDP (much below the SGP maximum limit) and a budget debt maximum of 60% of 
GDP for all Spanish public administrations. On 14 September, 2011, the Italian Senate 
approved the law on a balanced budget. Unlike Spain, however, the Italian lower chamber 
rejected the law on 10 October 2011, triggering an institutional crisis that only ended with the 
formation of an externally-imposed technocratic government, headed by Mario Conti (Bellucci 
2014). Spain would eventually sign a MoU for its banks on 25 June 2012.  
 
The Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) signed by deficit Eurozone countries and the Troika 
bound future elected governments. Therefore, alternation in office could not produce 
fundamental policy change. National governments of intervened economies were committed 
by the agreement to apply hard fiscal adjustment programs. The bail-out agreements de facto 
constrained national governments’ capacity to be responsive, as has been demonstrated by the 
recent analysis of Moses (2017). This created two separate groups of countries inside the 
Eurozone: those that could still balance responsibility and responsiveness (non-intervened 
countries) and those where responsibility was prioritized and, thus, responsiveness had to be 
weakened (intervened countries). 
                                                 
9 Corriere della Sera, ECB/national central bank letters to the governments of Spain and Italy, 5.8.2011. 
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Eurozone peripheral countries were forced, through the bail-outs and other informal forms of 
external intervention, to abandon responsiveness for the sake of being accountable to their EU 
partners. At this point, the comparison of the electoral support received by establishment parties 
in both intervened and non-intervened Eurozone countries is useful. Between 2008 and 2015, 
the establishment parties of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain lost more than twenty-
five percentage points while in non-intervened countries such electoral loss was less than ten 
percentage points.  
 
Here, we argue that this can only be explained by the unfolding of a fundamental crisis of 
political representation. The reason for the highly asymmetric impact of the economic recession 
on established parties in intervened and non-intervened countries is that while monetary 
constraints are equally distributed among all EMU countries, fiscal constraints are mostly felt 
in intervened countries. Inside a monetary union the adjustment burden falls largely on the side 
of deficit countries, which have no choice but to adjust their fiscal imbalances, and very little 
on the side of surplus countries, which face no pressure from the financial markets (Copelovitch 
et al. 2016). Citizens of intervened countries are not blind to this, as Eurobarometer data show. 
They realize that they are doing comparatively worse than their neighbours and partners and 
they attribute the responsibility for this to the whole political establishment, i.e. the centre-right 
and centre-left parties that historically led the process of construction of the EU and the 
monetary union, a system of rules that keeps them trapped inside the austerity net. This triggers 
a process of political learning by which citizens perceive the increasing loss of autonomy of 
national governments vis-à-vis EMU institutions (Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso 2017). This is the 
reason why support for the establishment is unequally distributed between intervened (i.e. 
deficit/debtor) and non-intervened (i.e. surplus/creditor) countries. 
 
In non-intervened countries of the Eurozone, by contrast, since there is no abandonment of 
responsiveness in that the populations of surplus countries are overall cushioned against the 
worst effects of the crisis, we do not expect support for the political establishment to fall as 
dramatically as in intervened countries. Moreover, in countries where citizens perceive their 
governments as defending the national interest against global economic forces and unelected 
European institutions, we expect the status quo to prevail, as the case of Germany embodies 
(Taggart and Szczerbiak 2013, Bernhard and Leblang 2016). 
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Our first hypothesis, therefore, can be stated as follows: Countries subject to high degrees of 
externally-imposed conditionality, such as those which were intervened by the Troika in the 
years between 2010 and 2015, will see a much larger fall of support for establishment parties 
than countries not subject to such conditionality. 
 
Our argument continues a path initiated by Hobolt and Tilley (2016). According to their 
analysis, voters are not only punishing bad economic performance but they are also responding 
to a larger and deeper dissatisfaction with the functioning of their political system. What voters 
are sanctioning is "the establishment consensus of austerity and European integration" (Hobolt 
and Tilley 2016: 971). Voters abandon the political centre to vote for parties that are highly 
critical of the European Union, those normally on the far right of the political spectrum, or that 
reject fiscal adjustment policies, those on the far left. Building on Hobolt and Tilley (2016) but 
using aggregate data, we here test one further hypothesis. We argue that the rejection of the 
political establishment, both national and European, is closely connected with establishment 
parties’ decision to prioritize responsibility over responsiveness. Furthermore, we claim that 
this shift has become evident particularly since 2010 and has involved establishment parties 
from both sides of the ideological spectrum. 
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1.3. The asymmetric costs of responsibility: Financial intervention and ideology 
The assumption that voters do not differentiate between Left and Right when punishing the 
political establishment needs to -and can be- empirically tested using a country-level analysis. 
There are good reasons to expect that ideology and partisanship matter. As demonstrated by 
Walter, Left establishment parties are more vulnerable to austerity policies whereas Right 
establishment parties are more vulnerable to external devaluation strategies (Walter 2016). The 
reason lies, on the one hand, in their respective traditional constituencies and, on the other, in 
their opposite attitudes towards public spending and fiscal orthodoxy. Since 1945, social-
democratic parties have been key actors in establishing the Post-war welfare states (Judt 2006). 
The establishment of programs sponsoring social protections has varied across countries but in 
most of the cases it was based on the policy response social-democratic parties had to their 
electorate (Esping-Andersen 2013; Hall and Soskice 2001). In this sense, the social-democratic 
agenda implied a set of policies aimed at the protection of the most vulnerable social sectors 
by focusing on reducing social inequalities (Maravall 2016). This agenda was particularly 
compromised during the Euro crisis when austerity programs became the policy norm within 
the Eurozone and Left parties, particularly in highly exposed economies, faced the decision to 
contest or accept the adoption of such policies (Blyth 2013).  
 
As Walter argues, devaluation “reduces purchasing power, which hurts consumers and firms 
who heavily rely on imported intermediate goods” (Walter 2016: 844) whereas austerity 
“typically leads to higher unemployment, lower wages, asset price inflation, and recession” 
(Walter 2016: 844). Fiscal consolidation implies large public spending cuts, tax increases and 
far-reaching structural reforms to liberalize labour markets and limit the bargaining power of 
trade unions. This results in high social costs for those national constituencies that depend on 
public spending and/or on highly regulated labour markets, the traditional constituencies of the 
Left (salaried, state sector employees, recipients of welfare, etc.). This leaves social-democratic 
parties unable to react in any meaningful way to protect their constituencies from the social 
costs of austerity, and also unable to get out of the austerity path. It is thus to be expected that 
the median voter of the Left might be more willing to reject the incapacity of social-democratic 
parties to stop fiscal adjustment and try an alternative economic policy than the median voter 
of the Right (Ferrera 2014, Galasso 2014, Hobolt and Tilley 2016, Walter 2016). 
 
Therefore, our second hypothesis goes as follows: In countries which are subject to high 
degrees of externally-imposed conditionality, such as those which were intervened by the 
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Troika in the years between 2010 and 2015, establishment parties will be asymmetrically hit 
by voters' loss of support. The centre-left (i.e. social democratic parties) will be more harshly 
punished than the centre-right (i.e. Christian-democrats, liberals and conservatives) because 
conditionality deprives them of their capacity to avoid internal adjustments, a signature policy 
of social democracy since the Second World War.  
 
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of the exogeneity of Troika financial 
interventions in our models. Some might argue that the bail-out agreements are endogenous 
factors as intervened countries were somehow predetermined to be intervened. One could think 
of the fragility of the banking system (Spain) or ill-designed institutions to control spending 
(Greece, Portugal) as determinants of financial intervention (Hall 2014). While we agree that 
these institutional designs may explain the observance of intervention, we also argue that the 
signature of a MoU is not a straightforward consequence of having poor macro-economic 
institutions. As we showed above, the adoption of a MoU was a political as much as an 
economic decision. In small economies under risk, the signature of MoUs was adopted; 
however, when the size of the economy was too large to be bailed-out, like in Italy and Spain, 
a pro-active role by the European Central Bank proofed also a viable response. It is, precisely, 
this variation in the type of responses given to the sovereign debt crisis that, in our view, 
justifies treating intervention as exogenous. 
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1.4. Some preliminary evidence 
Before we test our two hypotheses, we would like to offer some descriptive statistics of the 
phenomenon being explained. Figure 1 clearly reveals that although electoral support for 
establishment parties fell everywhere during the period of the Great Recession, the fall in 
intervened countries was considerably more dramatic. In those countries where governments 
prioritized responsibility, the vote shares of establishment parties collapsed. Between 2011 and 
2015 vote for establishment parties fell by approximately fifteen percentage points in 
intervened countries and just three percentage points in non-intervened ones. 
 
Figure 1: External interventions and electoral support for the political establishment (1999-
2015) 
  
 
The loss of support for establishment parties at the national level went hand in hand with a 
collapse of support for European institutions. Using Eurobarometer data, Figure 2 shows the 
evolution of the number of citizens who tend "not to trust" the European Commission between 
1999 and 2015. The difference between intervened and non-intervened countries is, again, 
dramatic. In countries that were not intervened, levels of mistrust in the European Commission 
increased from twenty-two percent in 2002 to forty percent in 2015; in intervened countries, 
during the same period, the jump was from ten percent to about fifty-three percent. 
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Figure 2: External interventions and lack of trust in the European Commission (1999-2015)
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2. Data 
To test the hypotheses developed in the previous sections we have collected electoral and 
economic data from the 12 countries that participated in the Stage I of the European Monetary 
Union between 1999 and 201510. The reason for doing this is to have a group of countries with 
a sufficiently large time span where the Eurozone rules were held constant across countries and 
where, therefore, our fundamental distinction between de jure and de facto limits on 
government autonomy holds for the longest possible period. Including countries outside EMU 
(i.e. UK or Sweden), characterized by different degrees of de jure constraints, or recent 
members of EMU (Slovenia entered in 2007, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014 
and Lithaunia in 2015), where citizens have no elements of comparison between before and 
after the crisis, would only introduce noise to our analysis. The unit of analysis is the election-
year and the electoral data refers to parliamentary elections only11. The dataset contains 54 
observations and the number of elections per country ranges from three – France and Ireland – 
to six – Portugal12. 
 
The dependent variable is the level of electoral support received by nationwide establishment 
parties13. In the second part of the analysis we disaggregate the vote share of establishment 
parties based on ideology. We operationalize establishment parties as those that a) have 
provided the Prime Minister (PM) in a government14 or b) have been the main opposition party 
or the second-largest party in parliament15 in the period under study. In essence, the parties 
considered in the analysis are those that have dominated the political life of the country since 
1945 and, therefore, have been key actors in the design of the EU.  
 
 
                                                 
10 The countries considered were already members of the Eurozone in the period 1999-2001: France, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland and Austria.  
11 Table A3 in the appendix shows a full list of the elections covered in the analysis. 
12 The sample misses the parliamentary elections in Greece in May 2012. In those elections, the vote share of the 
establishment parties was 32.1%, which is about 10% less than the results obtained by these parties in the elections 
that took place in June of that year. We have decided to keep the elections from June and not May as this is the 
election on whose results the government was decided. 
13 In coalition governments, this is the party to which the PM is affiliated to. We use the data collected by 
Armingeon et al. (2017) to operationalise this variable. 
14 Table A4 in the appendix shows the list of the parties considered in this analysis. We exclude Syriza from our 
list as Syriza is, precisely, the consequence of the collapse of establishment parties. 
15 This distinction is relevant as there are observations where both parties are in government forming a so-called 
“Grand coalition”.  
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Figure 3 shows the summary information of the vote-shares received by establishment parties. 
The parties considered in this article represent more than 50% of the total vote on average16. 
At the aggregate level, the mean value of the support for establishment parties is about 65% in 
the period under analysis. 
 
Figure 3 – Distribution of vote for establishment parties (1999-2015). 
 
The main independent variable of our analysis refers to whether a country is financially 
intervened or not. We call this variable Financial Intervention and is a binary variable that takes 
the value 1 if a country is a) under the formal conditionality of a Memorandum of 
Understanding or b) under informal pressure from European Institutions17. In our analysis, 
financially intervened countries are Greece (since 2010), Ireland (since 2010), Italy (since 
2011), Portugal (since 2011) and Spain (2011). Since the unit of analysis is the election-year, 
                                                 
16 The average vote-share for most of the countries under study range from 61% (Germany) to 77% (Spain). There 
are only four countries where such vote share is below 60%: Belgium (58%), France (57%), Italy (54%) and 
Luxembourg (56%). 
17 An example of informal pressure is the so-called “Trichet letters” that former ECB boss Jean-Claude Trichet 
sent to Ireland, Italy or Spain urging these countries to conduct structural reforms. See for example, 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/html/irish-letters.en.html for the Irish case or 
https://www.ft.com/content/3576e9c2-eaad-11e0-aeca-00144feab49a?mhq5j=e1 for the Italian case.  
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this means that 8 elections (fifteen percent of the total sample) were held in a context where 
citizens observed the de facto consequences of financial intervention on national fiscal policy. 
 
Finally, we also use two control variables. The first is the Government Deficit/Surplus (as 
percentage of GDP), measured as the 3-year moving average to account for lag effects. The 
second control variable is the annual change of GDP per capita. All the variables come from 
the AMECO dataset produced by Eurostat18. Table 1 shows the summary statistics used in the 
empirical analysis. 
 
Table 1 – Summary statistics. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min. Max. 
      
Electoral support 54 63.58 11.78 34.38 85.90 
Electoral support (Left) 54 27.05 9.413 6.290 46.40 
Electoral support (Right) 54 36.52 9.295 21.39 68.90 
Financial Intervention 54 0.148 0.359 0 1 
Deficit (3 years MA) 54 -2.781 4.022 -17.70 5.333 
GDP capita (% change) 54 0.650 1.753 -5.700 3.900 
      
Number of countries 12 12 12 12 12 
 
 
3. Identifying “Financial Intervention” 
Our argument about the asymmetric effects of financial intervention on support for 
establishment parties requires some further clarifications about what it really means to be under 
financial intervention and how this relates to other macro-economic indicators. To properly 
identify our empirical estimation model, this question must be answered. 
 
To do so, we run a series of visual and multivariate tests. To perform these tests, we use the 
variables Financial Intervention and GDP per capita, as previously defined, but we also include 
yearly values of a) Government Deficit (% GDP); b) Debt (% GDP); and c) Unemployment 
measured as a share of the total active population19. Figure 4 shows the graphical representation 
of t-tests comparing the means of these economic indicators in countries that were and were 
not intervened during the periods before and after the first intervention. 
                                                 
18 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm 
19 The data comes from the AMECO dataset published by Eurostat. 
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Figure 4 – Economic consequences of being intervened 
 
 
The graph reveals larger statistical significances in countries that were intervened than in 
countries that were not. This first analysis indicates a co-linear relationship between being 
financially intervened and some of these macro-economic indicators. In fact, the correlation 
between being intervened and unemployment is 0.72 and it is 0.56 when intervention is 
correlated with yearly levels of debt20. These strong correlations may generate a 
misspecification in the estimation of the coefficients if the full list of covariates used here were 
used simultaneously. 
 
As a further test to identify the relevant independent variables, and to also properly identify 
financial intervention, we conduct a principal component factor analysis. Looking at the 
                                                 
20 See Table A5 in the Appendix. 
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unrotated factors loading, the analysis reveals the existence of two factors21. Financial 
Intervention, Unemployment and Debt can be identified in the same factor while levels of GDP 
per capita would be the main component of a second factor.  
 
Both mean-comparison tests and factor analysis confirm a strong relationship between being 
financially intervened and several macro-economic indicators such as level of debt or 
unemployment22. This is sufficient to justify leaving these two particular macro-economic 
indicators out of the analysis while using the variable financial intervention along with levels 
of GDP per capita and levels of deficit as further control variables. 
 
4. The effect of financial interventions on support for establishment parties 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following model: 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝜇𝑐,𝑡 
 
Where Support refers to the vote-share of nationwide establishment parties as defined above. 
The parameter of interest is 𝛿, which should capture the size of how much impact financial 
intervention has on the dependent variable. The parameter 𝛾 is a vector containing the macro-
economic indicators used as control variables and the parameter 𝜌 is an autoregressive vector 
containing the lag value of the dependent variable. This variable is included to account for the 
temporal linear dependence. Finally, all the models include country-fixed effects which are 
captured by the parameter 𝜃23. In the model, subscrits c and t refer to country c and election t 
respectively. To estimate the models, we use OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) 
as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995, 1996). The estimation accounts for the unbalanced 
nature of the panels and assumes panel-level heteroskedastic errors.  
 
Table A1 in the appendix shows all the details of the different estimated models used to test 
hypothesis 1. Model 1 only considers the macro-economic variables. It shows a positive 
statistical effect of Deficit on the dependent variable. As economic voting theory predicts, good 
                                                 
21 The Eigenvalue of Factor 1 is 2.71 and the second one is 1.02. See Table A6 in the Appendix. 
22 This is further confirmed by replicating model 5 from Table A1 adding both unemployment and debt as further 
independent variables. The VIF values of these two variables after estimating this new regression are 14.13 and 
10.52, which are strong indications of serious imperfect collinearity. 
23 The findings remain the same if further year effects are included. These findings can be seen in the 
supplementary material. 
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economic performance increases electoral support for establishment parties. Here, it means that 
countries with budget surplus were also countries where establishment parties received higher 
levels of support. The effect of Deficit, however, vanishes once the model accounts for being 
financially intervened. When this is the case, only the variable Intervention is statistically 
significant under various model specifications. Figure 5 summarizes these findings. 
 
Figure 5 – Financial intervention and support for establishment parties. 
 
Models 2 to 5 in Table A1 estimate the effect of intervention under various specifications. 
Model 2 is estimated without adding any macro-economic control, after which macro-
economic controls are introduced sequentially. Model 3 considers GDP per capita, Model 4 
considers only Deficit and Model 5 includes both GDP and Deficit. The coefficients range from 
-15.87 (Model 2) to -14.92 (Model 5) and the statistical significance is always less than 0.01. 
These values confirm our first hypothesis. Models 2 to 5 also reveal that, in fact, citizens living 
in countries where responsibility trumps responsiveness (i.e. intervened countries) punish 
establishment parties more severely. 
 
Finally, Model 6 in Table A1 in the appendix shows the impact of intervention on support for 
establishment parties depending on the ideology of the party that was in government when the 
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MoU was signed or the informal pressures took place24. Intervention is only significant when 
a Left government oversaw managing the crisis; its effect disappears if the government was a 
conservative one. This finding indicates that most of the support was lost on the Left rather 
than the Right, as our second hypothesis claims. We further explore this question in the next 
section. 
 
5. Financial interventions and support for the Left 
Table A2 in the appendix tests our second hypothesis regarding the asymmetrical effect of 
party ideology on the loss of support for establishment parties. The model is like the one used 
in the previous section; however, the dependent variable now refers to the vote share of 
establishment parties from the Left and from the Right. Models 1 and 3 in Table A2 estimate 
the effect of intervention on support for Left and Right establishment parties respectively. 
Intervention is statistically different from 0 in the case of support for Left parties and has no 
impact on support for Right political platforms. Models 2 and 4 estimate similar models but 
intervention now also indicates the ideology of the government when intervention first took 
place. Again, only support for Left parties suffers a negative and statistically significant effect 
of intervention while support for Right parties is unaffected. Model 2 also shows that Left 
parties are severely punished when intervention takes place under a Left government. More 
concretely, support for the Left decreased by twenty-four percentage points when a Left 
government managed the financial intervention while support for the Right decreased by only 
six percentage points in the case of a Right government. 
 
The discussion of these findings confirms our second hypothesis. Left parties were more 
sensitive to the policies put forward by financial bailout packages than Right parties. Under a 
context of policy restriction, implementing an agenda based on internal devaluations with high 
costs imposed to, most notably, the lower and middle social classes had different electoral 
consequences for the Left compared to the Right.  
 
Figure 6 provides further illustration of this idea. It plots the predicted values of support to Left 
and Right establishment parties considering that intervention was implemented under a Left 
and a Right government respectively. The predictions are plotted for various levels of deficit. 
                                                 
24 Financial interventions occurred under Left governments in Spain and Greece while it happened under Right 
governments in Italy, Ireland and Portugal. 
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The two predictions are statistically significant and show how the Left collapsed when 
intervention was managed under a Left government. Paradoxically, as deficit improved, 
support for the Left decreased. Instead of rewarding the government for good economic 
performance, Left establishment parties were punished as this reduction of the deficit was the 
direct consequence of adopting drastic internal devaluation policies. In a scenario of economic 
intervention with high levels of unemployment as the one pictured in Figure 4 above, the 
adoption by the Left of austerity measures as dictated by the Troika came at a cost. The picture 
is completely different in the case of support for the Right. Intervention managed by the Right 
implied increasing electoral support as levels of deficit were corrected. In summary, in the 
context of the fiscal policies imposed by financial interventions within the Eurozone, the price 
of responsibility was much higher for the Left than for the Right establishment parties. 
 
Figure 6 – Consequences of being responsible (i.e. reducing the deficit) under financial 
intervention. 
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6. Robustness tests 
To check the robustness of our results we conduct several tests. First, we test our main 
hypothesis altering the sample by omitting countries that according to our data are either 
outliers or may be unusual compared to the rest of the sample. Table 2 replicates models in 
Table A1 excluding Greece, Ireland and Italy from the analysis. First, Models 1 and 2 replicate 
the analysis excluding Greece25. The logic is to exclude a country where the fall of the 
establishment parties – particularly PASOK – has been so dramatic that it could be driving the 
results. Our analysis confirms that this is not the case. In both models, intervention is negative 
and statistically significant. The coefficient, in line with our previous analysis, is particularly 
strong when intervention was adopted by a Left government.  
 
A similar logic is used to exclude Italy from the analysis. The background is, however, different 
from the case of Greece. As Figure 4 shows, support for establishment parties in Italy has 
always been relatively low compared to the rest of the countries under study. Also, Italy did 
receive significant informal pressure from the EU and even experienced a technocratic 
government headed by Mario Monti, a former EU top officer, but was never bailed-out. The 
analysis shown in Models 5 and 6 reveals, again, the direction, strength and statistical 
significance of intervention after excluding Italy from the analysis. 
 
Finally, Models 3 and 4 exclude Ireland from the sample as it is identified as an outlier in our 
data. Our claims continue to hold when this country is also excluded. 
                                                 
25Tables S1 and S2 in the Online Supplement material show the full results of these estimations. 
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Table 2 – Robustness test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES no GRE no GRE no IRL no IRL no ITA no ITA 
       
Intervention -7.916*  -12.95***  -12.90***  
 (4.161)  (4.248)  (4.847)  
Intervention (Left)  -16.74***  -22.79***  -22.98*** 
  (6.161)  (5.076)  (4.632) 
Intervention (Right)  -4.379  -6.161  2.669 
  (4.423)  (4.726)  (3.653) 
Observations 49 49 51 51 50 50 
R-squared 0.577 0.602 0.656 0.694 0.628 0.731 
Number of countries 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Panel Corrected Standard Errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Our second set of robustness tests uses a different independent variable. Instead of just looking 
at formal or informal intervention, we use the periods when countries were under the 
constraints of a MoU. Our new independent variable, MoU, captures the event of receiving the 
most extreme form of financial intervention. Table 3 replicates the main models from Tables 
A1 and A2. The results also remain consistent with the previous findings.  
 
Table 3 – Robustness test 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Left Right 
    
MoU -10.58* -14.78*** 0.571 
 (6.407) (4.788) (4.019) 
Observations 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.565 0.668 0.705 
Number of countries 12 12 12 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Panel Corrected Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7. Concluding remarks 
This article has shown that when alternation in government does not produce change in 
economic policy, citizens lose trust in the political establishment and turn to political parties 
outside the establishment, or even openly against it. Citizens expect that punishing national 
governments for bad economic performance leads to alternative policy paths. At the same time, 
citizens also understand that national governments are not completely free to do as their citizens 
wish them to, particularly in the context of the European Monetary Union. For this reason, 
citizens exonerate national governments for bad, or unresponsive, economic performance in 
the short-term, as research on economic voting has demonstrated. However, when policy 
constraints are so overwhelming that repeated alternations in office do not produce any change, 
as is the case in externally-intervened countries, exoneration is replaced by abandonment of 
the whole political establishment; that is, establishment parties from both the Left and the 
Right, together with the larger supra-national institutions that constrain countries’ sovereignty 
to the point where national politicians cannot be responsive to their national electorates. This 
article has also shown that when the objective of external interventions is the imposition of 
drastic internal devaluation policies, Left establishment parties in charge of implementing them 
suffer a much larger loss of support than Right establishment parties.  
 
Our findings are far from definitive. We need larger time spans to be able to test them further 
and to analyze their implications. First, our findings show that we need to differentiate between 
the short- and the long-term. Financial interventions that last one legislature seem to be less 
damaging to the political establishment than interventions that last several electoral cycles. 
Second, our findings also show that we need to explore further the difference between Left and 
Right establishment parties. Reducing the levels of deficit under conditions of external 
intervention is good for the Right and very bad for the Left. If Right establishment parties are 
not abandoned for forcing austerity upon unwilling populations, why are they then being 
abandoned?  If the imposition of harsh austerity against the will of the majority hurts the Left 
so badly, how is it going to affect in the medium- and long-term incumbent Left anti-
establishment parties such as Syriza in Greece? These questions need to be addressed once 
larger time spans make more data available to the research community.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: The effect of intervention on political competition. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All All All All All All 
       
Intervention  -15.87*** -14.94*** -15.71*** -14.92***  
  (3.136) (4.129) (3.165) (4.132)  
Intervention (Left)      -25.83*** 
      (4.608) 
Intervention (Right)      -5.587 
      (4.532) 
Deficit 1.082***  0.153  0.130 0.187 
 (0.379)  (0.382)  (0.397) (0.332) 
GDP capita 0.685   0.682 0.672 0.788* 
 (0.684)   (0.562) (0.565) (0.464) 
Support (Lag) 0.507*** 0.448*** 0.452*** 0.426*** 0.429*** 0.312*** 
 (0.178) (0.134) (0.134) (0.132) (0.133) (0.120) 
Constant 35.84*** 35.51*** 35.86*** 36.46*** 36.75*** 43.42*** 
 (10.34) (8.275) (8.300) (8.084) (8.124) (6.991) 
       
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.541 0.626 0.626 0.634 0.634 0.699 
Number of countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Panel Corrected Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
29 
 
Table A2 – The cost of responsibility vs responsiveness. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Left Left Right Right 
     
Intervention -14.95***  -0.680  
 (3.502)  (3.015)  
Intervention (Left)  -24.51***  -3.471 
  (3.279)  (3.651) 
Intervention (Right)  -6.482*  2.048 
  (3.454)  (3.926) 
Deficit -0.631** -0.568*** 0.711*** 0.733*** 
 (0.309) (0.213) (0.241) (0.243) 
GDP capita 0.497 0.545* 0.382 0.407 
 (0.427) (0.318) (0.345) (0.334) 
Left support (Lag) 0.297* 0.222*   
 (0.159) (0.115)   
Right support (Lag)   0.0723 0.0191 
   (0.147) (0.154) 
Constant 16.83*** 18.95*** 33.80*** 35.47*** 
 (4.160) (2.918) (5.136) (5.345) 
     
Observations 54 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.730 0.817 0.705 0.713 
Number of countries 12 12 12 12 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Panel Corrected Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A3 – List of countries and elections 
Country Elections 
Austria 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013 
Belgium 1999,2003, 2007, 2010, 2014 
Finland 1999,2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 
France 2002, 2007, 2012 
Germany 2002, 2005,2009, 2013 
Greece 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012*, 2015 
Ireland 2002, 2007, 2011 
Italy 2001, 2006, 2008 2013 
Luxembourg 1999, 2004, 2009, 2013 
Netherlands 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012 
Portugal 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015 
Spain 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015 
*For the reasons explained in Fn. 12, we only use the elections from June 2012. 
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Table A4 – List of establishment parties  
 
Establishment Political Parties 
Country Party1 Party2 Party3 Party4 
Austria Socialist Party 
(SPÖ) 
People´s Party 
(ÖVP) 
  
Belgium Social 
Progressive 
Alternative 
(SP.a-SPIRIT) 
(until 2001: 
Flemish 
Socialist 
Francophone 
Socialist Party 
(PS)Party (SP), 
in 2003 and 
2007: electoral 
coalition with 
SPIRIT ) 
Francophone 
Socialist Party 
(PS) 
Christian 
Democrat & 
Flemish (CD & V)  
Open Flemish 
Liberals & 
Democrats (Open 
VLD) (until 2007: 
Flemish Liberals 
& Democrats 
(VLD); former: 
Flemish Party of 
Liberty and 
Progress (PVV)); 
Reform Movement 
(MR) (former 
Francophone 
Liberal Reform 
Party (PRL); in 
1995: Alliance 
with FDF; in 1999: 
Fédération PRL-
FDF-MCC) 
(Francophone) 
Finland Social 
Democrats 
(SDP) 
Centre Party 
(KESK) 
National Coalition 
(KOK) 
 
France Socialist Party 
(PS) 
Gaullists, 
Rally for the 
Republic 
(RPR) (in 
2002: Union 
for a 
Presidential 
Majority 
(UMP); in 
2007: Union 
for a Popular 
Movement 
(UMP)) 
  
Germany Social 
Democrats 
(SPD) 
Christian 
Democratic 
Union (CDU) 
Christian Social 
Union (CSU) 
 
Greece Pan-Hellenic 
Socialist 
Movement 
(PASOK) 
New 
Democracy 
(ND) 
  
Ireland Fianna Fail Fine Gael Labour 
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Italy Democratic 
Party (PD) 
(Olive Tree 
and the 
Radical Party 
in 2006; The 
Olive Tree 
(Democrats of 
the Left (DS) 
and the 
Margherita 
(DI)) 
Democrats of 
the Left (DS) 
(reformist 
wing of the 
disbanded PCI 
(1991)) 
Forza Italia The People of 
Freedom (PDL), 
(Forza Italia and 
National Alliance) 
Luxembourg Socialist 
Workers’ Party 
(LSAP) 
Christian 
Social Party 
(PCS/CSV) 
  
Netherlands Labour Party 
(PvdA) 
Christian 
Democratic 
Appeal (CDA)  
People’s Party for 
Freedom and 
Democracy(VVD) 
 
Portugal Socialist Party 
(PS) 
Social 
Democrats, 
Popular 
Democrats 
(PPD/PSD) 
  
Spain Socialist Party 
(PSOE) 
Popular Party 
(PP) 
  
 
  
32 
 
Table A5 – Correlation matrix between macro-economic indicators and intervention 
 intervention GDP cap Debt Deficit Unemployment 
Intervention 1     
GDP cap 0.0642 1    
Debt 0.5567 -0.0876 1   
Deficit -0.4462 0.0267 -0.5621 1  
Unemployment 0.7257 -0.0045 0.5986 -0.5298 1 
 
Table A6 – Principal Component Analysis: Factor loadings (unrotated) 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness  
Intervention 0.8338 0.1552 0.2807 
GDP cap -0.025 0.9882 0.0229 
Debt 0.8252 -0.1266 0.303 
Deficit -0.7576 0.059 0.4225 
Unemployment 0.8746 0.0508 0.2325 
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